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I. INTRODUCTION
Collective bargaining in the private sector enables employees,
through their union, to participate in creating and administering the
rules of the workplace.' Collective bargaining agreements between
. 1. See Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61 CALIF. L.
REV. 663, 721-24 (1973). The discussion in this Comment is confined to issues that arise in the
judicial review of arbitrators' decisions to reinstate private sector employees who were
discharged for violating laws and administrative regulations. This Comment does not address
arbitration in the public sector, because the public interest in effective and efficient government
that pervades public labor-management relations results in a different mix of policy
considerations. See 5 U.S.C. § 7101 (1982) (Collective bargaining is tailored to meet the
"special requirements and needs of the Government."); 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (1982)
(mandating the use of grievance arbitration in the federal government).
Three federal labor acts are applicable to the private sector employees who are the subject
of this Comment. The Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) applies to employees in
private industries that affect interstate commerce. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947)
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982)) (amending the National Labor Relations Act, 49
Stat. 449 (1935)) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (1982)). The Railway Labor
Act covers both railway and air carrier employees. 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1982). Postal
workers have a hybrid status in the area of labor relations under chapter 12 of the Postal
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (1982). In enacting the Postal Reorganization
Act, Congress sought to reform the labor-management structure of the newly organized Postal
Service by bringing "postal labor relations within the same structure that exists for nationwide
enterprises in the private sector." H.R. REP. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1970
U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3649, 3662. With regard to strikes and interest
arbitration, however, postal workers are treated as other federal employees. They may not
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unions and employers typically limit an employer's right to discharge
and discipline employees. 2 The employer normally gives up its other-
wise broad discretion over disciplinary action3 through a provision in
the agreement requiring "just cause" for such action.4 In exchange
for this provision, a union typically will promise not to strike.' As a
result of this quid pro quo, 6 unions and employers agree to resolve
their disputes according to the terms of their collective agreement
without the use of economic coercion by either party.7 The grievance
strike and must resort to binding arbitration should they or the Postal Service reach an
impasse in the course of collective bargaining. H.R. REP. No. 1104, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3649, 3658, 3662-64. For examples of
the judicial approach to labor disputes in the Postal Service, see National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. United States Postal Service, 590 F.2d 1171, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Melendy v.
United States Postal Service, 589 F.2d 256, 259-60 (7th Cir. 1978); Winston v. United States
Postal Service, 585 F.2d 198, 207 (7th Cir. 1978); Malone v. United States Postal Service, 526
F.2d 1099, 1103-04 (6th Cir. 1975).
There is a divergence of opinion among the circuits as to how the hybrid nature of postal
labor relations should affect the scope of judicial review of arbitral reinstatements. See infra
note 129. An in-depth discussion of this issue, however, is beyond the scope of this Comment.
The cases that the various courts of appeal have decided are nonetheless exemplary of judicial
treatment of the public policy exception generally, and courts addressing the public policy
exception in the context of the private sector cite them as persuasive.
2. Under common law doctrine, employers may discharge employees at will, without
notice or cause. This right, however, is not necessarily absolute. Judicial decisions, em-
ployment discrimination laws, and collective bargaining agreements all limit management's
freedom to discharge. For a general discussion of these limitations, see Krauskopf, Em-
ployment Discharge.- Survey and Critique of the Modern at Will Rule, 51 UMKC L. REV. 189
(1983); Comment, Employers Beware: The Implied Contract Exception to the Employment-at-
Will Doctrine, 28 B.C.L. REV. 327 (1987); Comment, Erosion of the Employment-at-Will
Doctrine: Choosing a Legal Theoryfor Wrongful Discharge, 14 CAP. U.L. REV. 461 (1985);
Note, Protecting Employees at Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception,
96 HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983); Note, Protecting at Will Employees Against Wrongful
Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980).
3. Disciplinary actions usually take one of two forms: temporary suspension, during
which an employee generally is not paid, or discharge. If the employer elects the latter, the
employee's job, seniority, and benefits are revoked and his reputation is tarnished. See F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 660 (1985).
4. See Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARV. L. REV. 601, 613 (1956). Many
arbitrators infer the "just cause" limitation, even if it is not expressly contained in the
collective agreement. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 651.
5. The Supreme Court of the United States has used injunctions to enforce a union's
obligation not to strike, whether the obligation is expressed or implied. See Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flower
Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
6. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
7. The use of economic coercion not only harms management through lost productivity
and profits, but labor as well through lost workdays and wages. See D. BOK & J. DUNLOP,
LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 229 (1970); C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND
LABOR RELATIONS 22 (1970). Unions and employers agree to refrain from using economic
coercion to resolve their differences during the term of their agreement. This means, however,
that the parties use economic pressure extensively during negotiations over the collective
agreement itself. Courts acknowledge the use of economic pressure in collective bargaining as
[Vol. 42:767
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procedures that are established in the agreement thus become a
union's primary means of ensuring that the employer adheres to its
promises.8 If an employer disciplines an employee, the union may
submit a grievance on behalf of its member to the management hierar-
chy in an attempt to reverse the actions of managers or supervisors at
lower levels.9 Through this review procedure, employers and unions
settle most grievances arising out of disciplinary actions taken against
employees." ° If the employer maintains its position, however, the
union may submit its case to an arbitrator pursuant to the collective
bargaining agreement. "
As the preferred means of resolving disputes arising under a col-
lective agreement, grievance arbitration has come to occupy a central
an integral part of the process. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 494
(1960); see also Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986) (Resort
to economic pressure is a legitimate part of the collective bargaining process.); Belknap, Inc. v.
Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 500 (1983) (Federal law is intended to leave employers and unions free to
use economic pressure against one another during collective bargaining.); Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S.
132, 147 (1976) (Both employers and employees have the right to resort to economic tactics
during collective bargaining if more amicable measures fail.). Thus judicial support for
arbitration is necessary to prevent the economic pressure that may occur during bargaining
from continuing into the ongoing relationship between the employer and the union. Brief for
Petitioners at 18, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) (No.
86-651).
8. See Feller, supra note 1, at 741-42; Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor
Relations, 68 HARV. L. REV. 999, 1007 (1955); see also Katz, Minimizing Disputes Through the
Adjustment of Grievances, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 249, 252 (1947) (grievance procedures
provide a "daily confirmation of the right of the workers to participate in directing the course
of their lives"); Selekman, Handling Shop Grievances, 23 HARV. Bus. REV. 469, 469 (1945)
(arguing for a recognition of grievance procedures as "the very heart of shop relationships").
9. See Feller, supra note 1, at 742. The Supreme Court has recognized the integral role
that grievance procedures play in enabling unions to enforce their collective bargaining
agreements. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965). The Maddox Court stated:
"As a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that
individual employees wishing to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract
grievance procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress." Maddox,
379 U.S. at 652. Notwithstanding the merits of the underlying grievance, arbitrators will often
deny or limit a grievant's request for relief if the grievant failed to utilize an available grievance
procedure. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 199.
10. See NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 438 (1965); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI,
supra note 3, at 153-54, 157-58. Successful arbitration relies upon the grievance procedure to
sift out those claims that are less meritorious. Otherwise, the sheer number of claims would
overburden arbitration's capacity to resolve them. See id.; see also Maddox, 379 U.S. at 653
(1965) (Rules permitting employees to sidestep the grievance procedure would disrupt both the
negotiation and administration of collective agreements.).
11. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 1007-08; Feller, supra note 1, at 745. As of 1986,
approximately ninety-five percent of the collective bargaining agreements negotiated in the
United States contained an arbitration clause. GOULD, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR
LAW 136 (2d ed. 1986).
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role in American labor law. ' 2 Because the union arbitrates only those
issues that the union and the employer have been unable to resolve,
the way in which an arbitrator resolves them may be of great impor-
tance to their continuing relationship.13 Unlike a judge, who may
consider the public interest involved in a particular case, the arbitra-
tor has no authority to look beyond the collective agreement in a
given workplace to resolve a grievance. 14 The collective agreement,
therefore, defines the arbitrator's role. Furthermore, the collective
agreement typically details the means by which the parties select the
arbitrator,'" establishes the scope of the arbitrator's authority, and
forms the body of "law" from which the arbitrator's decision must
12. See Kaden, Judges and Arbitrators.- Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1980); Congress expressed a policy preference for arbitration of
workplace disputes and for the finality of arbitrators' decisions in section 203(d) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, which provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by
the parties [to a collective agreement] is hereby declared to be the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court doctrine securing arbitration's centrality in American labor law, see infra notes 35-53.
13. The closer a grievance comes to arbitration, the greater its potential for affecting the
collective agreement. See generally Cox, supra note 4, at 606-16 (demonstrating the many
ways in which the processing of an individual dispute through grievance procedures and
arbitration can affect the union as an organization and other employees generally). In Vaca v.
Sipes, the Court affirmed arbitration's unique role in maintaining a union's strength in its
relationship with the employer:
Though we accept the proposition that a union may not arbitrarily ignore a
meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory fashion, we do not agree that
the individual employee has an absolute right to have his grievance taken to
arbitration .. . . [T]he settlement process furthers the interest of the union as
statutory agent and as coauthor of the bargaining agreement in representing the
employees in the enforcement of that agreement.
386 U.S. 171, 191 (1967).
14. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 1016. It is precisely this broader authority that
characterizes the institutional setting of judicial decisions. Unlike the arbitrator, the judge
must consider the public interest in resolving disputes. The judge's authority is not derived
solely from an agreement between the litigants before him. See id. at 1008-09. Grievance
arbitration in the labor relations context also differs from other forms of arbitration. Although
commercial arbitration is an alternative to litigation, labor arbitration is an alternative to the
use of economic pressure to resolve workplace disputes. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79 (1960).
15. See Jones, "His Own Brand of Industrial Justice": The Stalking Horse of Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration, 30 UCLA L. REV. 881, 889-93 (1983). Employers and unions
closely scrutinize potential arbitrators because each perceives the selection of an arbitrator as
an important factor in the outcome of the dispute. As Professor Jones noted, the prior
decisions of a potential arbitrator are a central consideration: "[E]lements commonly
examined by the parties include at least the following: experience, education, past decisions on
point, temperament, fairmindedness, past decisions on point, skepticism, insight, past decisions
on point, intelligence, articulateness and, finally, past decisions on point." Id. at 889.
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derive. 6 At the same time, however, the arbitrator must interpret the
often vague language that these agreements contain in a way that rec-
ognizes the fact that the parties before him are engaged in a continu-
ing relationship.' 7 Although arbitration takes place in the context of
individual disputes, it is an integral part of an ongoing collective bar-
gaining system designed to enhance the union's effectiveness in the
workplace, increase the employer's productivity, and secure just
results for aggrieved employees.' 8 Consequently, the arbitrator must
be sensitive to each of these concerns as he resolves workplace
disputes."
Arbitrators generally consider three factors in determining
whether an employer's reasons for disciplining an employee consti-
tuted just cause.2 0 The first factor is whether the employer has proven
that the employee committed the acts that led to the disciplinary
action.2 ' The second factor is whether the employer accorded proce-
16. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 1008-09. The arbitrator may draw reasonable inferences
from the agreement if necessary. See id. at 1011-12.
17. See Feller, supra note 1, at 750; Kaden, supra note 12, at 274 (citing Cox, Reflections
Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1490-93 (1959); Shulman, supra note 8, at
1024)); see also Fischer, Updating Arbitration, 26 NAT'L ARB. A. PROC. 65 (1973) ("When a
judge settles a case, it is over; but an arbitrator makes a decision which both parties must live
with .... ").
18. See Shulman, supra note 8, at 1024.
19. The arbitrator must take care to adhere to the collective agreement to avoid any
appearance that he exceeded his authority. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960).
20. These three factors are a condensed version of the seven-question test established in
Grief Bros. Cooperage Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., District 50, Local No. 15277, 42
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 555, 557-59 (Daugherty, Arb.). These seven questions include: (1) Whether
the employer forewarned the employee of the possible consequences of his conduct; (2)
Whether the rule violated was reasonably related to the efficient and safe operation of the
employer's enterprise; (3) Whether the employer, before disciplining the employee, attempted
to discover whether the employee actually committed the acts in question; (4) Whether the
employer's investigation was fair and objective; (5) Whether the evidence against the employee
was substantial; (6) Whether the employer applied its rule evenhandedly; and (7) Whether the
degree of discipline was reasonably related to the seriousness of the employee's proven offense
and the employee's prior employment record. Id. at 558-59. The American Arbitration
Association has accepted this test as a guideline for arbitrators resolving discipline grievances.
See Indianapolis Rubber Co. v. United Rubber Local 110, 79 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 529, 534
(Gibson, Arb.).
21. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 661-63. As one arbitrator has stated:
[I]t seems reasonable and proper to hold that alleged misconduct of a kind which
carries the stigma of general social disapproval as well as disapproval under
accepted canons of plant discipline should be clearly and convincingly
established by the evidence. Reasonable doubts raised by the proofs should be
resolved in favor of the accused. This may mean that the employer will at times
be required, for want of sufficient proof, to withhold or rescind disciplinary
action which in fact is fully deserved, but this kind of result is inherent in any
civilized system of justice.
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dural due process to the employee in the events leading up to and
following discipline.22 Finally, the arbitrator considers any mitigating
circumstances and determines whether some lesser penalty would be
more appropriate. 23 Thus over time, arbitrators' decisions establish
an understanding of the meaning of just cause under the particular
collective agreement.24
Once an arbitrator has resolved a grievance, either the union or
the employer may attempt to overturn the arbitrator's award on the
ground that it violated the collective agreement. 25 The possibility that
a judge may review and ultimately reverse an arbitrator's decision
presents a tension that exists, at least theoretically, between arbitra-
tors and judges. Both arbitrators and judges are primarily concerned
with resolving disputes. They are fundamentally different, however,
because the proceedings through which they operate vary in both
structure and purpose. 26 The benefits arising from peaceful and effi-
cient resolution of disputes between unions and employers motivated
Kroger Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 406, 25 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 906, 908
(1955) (Smith, Arb.).
22. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 673. The basic notions of fairness
implicit in the concept of due process include failure to make a reasonable investigation before
assessing an employee's punishment and attempting to cite additional reasons for disciplinary
action after it has already occurred. See id. at 675-76.
23. The arbitrator's authority to modify the penalties that the employer initially imposes
varies with the collective bargaining agreement. Many agreements expressly or impliedly give
the arbitrator authority to modify penalties that he finds to be improper. See id. at 667, 670-
71.
24. Although arbitrators' decisions interpreting provisions of a collective agreement may
have authoritative force, the majority of decisions are regarded as persuasive. Id. at 430. An
arbitrator's decision interpreting a provision of a particular collective agreement usually
becomes a binding part of that agreement and is applied by subsequent arbitrators. Id. at 425.
These three just cause inquiries may be theoretically distinct, but they often blend together in
fact. For example, an arbitrator may ignore evidence that the employer offers on the ground
that the employer was unaware of it prior to the disciplinary action. This combined inquiry of
proof and procedure may lead an arbitrator to reinstate an employee who, in light of the
evidence, was in fact impaired. See infra notes 176-79 and accompanying text.
25. Unions or employers may bring suit in any federal district court under section 301(a)
of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982) or the Postal
Reorganization Act, 39 U.S.C. § 1208(b) (1982). The federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
for disputes arising under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 159 (1982). See AFSCME v.
State of Illinois, 158 Il1. App. 3d. 584, 511 N.E.2d 749 (IIl. App.Ct. 1987); Amalgamated
Transit Union, Division 1300 v. Mass Transit Admin., 305 Md. 380, 504 A.2d 1132 (1986);
Lansing Community College v. Lansing Community College Chapter of the Mich. Ass'n for
Higher Educ., 161 Mich. App. 321, 409 N.W.2d 823 (1987).
26. Kaden, supra note 12, at 267. Thus it is not surprising that scholars such as the late
Judge Paul R. Hays, who consider arbitration to be analogous to traditional adjudication, find
arbitration threatening:
A system of adjudication in which the judge depends for his livelihood or even
for a substantial part of his livelihood or even for substantial supplements to his
regular income, on whether he pleases those who hire him to judge is per se a
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Congress to adopt a federal labor policy that strongly favors arbitra-
tion and the finality of the arbitrator's decision.2 7 Consistent with this
federal pblicy preferring arbitral finality, the Supreme Court has
developed a doctrine of judicial deference to arbitration decisions.2 8
The Court subsequently stated in WR. Grace & Co. v. Local Union
759, International Union of the United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum &
Plastic Workers of America,29 however, that judges need not defer to
arbitrators' awards that violate public policy. In the wake of Grace,
the federal circuits have expanded this "public policy exception" to
limit the presumption of finality,3" particularly when reviewing arbi-
trators' decisions to reinstate employees who have engaged in illegal
or irresponsible behavior that threatened workplace safety or public
welfare. The cases involving these "impaired workers"'" thus provide
an appropriate vehicle for exploring the growth of the public policy
exception and examining its ramifications for the relationship between
arbitrators and the courts.
The continued expansion of the public policy exception has cre-
ated incentives for parties who are discontent with arbitration deci-
sions to abandon them and instead pursue litigation in the courts.
This Comment questions whether arbitration can continue to perform
its traditional role as a source of stability in labor-management rela-
tions in light of the expanded public policy exception. Section II
examines the underpinnings of judicial deference to arbitration and
the public policy exception to the presumption of arbitral finality.
Sections III and IV of this Comment survey the subsequent develop-
ment of the exception in the federal circuits and the impact of the
Supreme Court's recent decision in United Paperworkers International
Union v. Misco, Inc. 32 In Section V, this Comment assesses the cur-
thoroughly undesirable system. In no proper system of justice should a judge be
submitted to such pressures.
P. HAYS, LABOR ARBITRATION 112 (1966).
27. See supra note 12.
28. Beginning with Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, the Supreme Court developed
a body of federal common law in labor relations. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The preference for
finality of arbitration has resulted in a common law doctrine restricting judicial review of
grievance arbitration decisions. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
For a discussion of these cases, collectively referred to as the Steelworkers Trilogy, see infra
notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
29. 461 U.S. 757 (1983); see infra notes 54-67 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 86-186 and accompanying text.
31. This Comment uses the term "impaired worker" to describe employees-alcohol or
drug users and other illegal or reckless actors-whom employers have chosen to discharge as a
result of their wrongful conduct.
32. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987); see infra notes 76-193 and accompanying text.
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rent state of the public policy exception. After concluding that Misco
has clarified only the extreme ends of the range of possible
approaches, this Comment concludes that, as long as the exception's
scope remains unresolved, arbitration's efficacy as a source of stability
in labor-management relations remains uncertain. On this basis, this
Comment proposes a means of limiting the exception to incorporate
the public interest in deterring actions that threaten workplace safety
and public welfare, while respecting the integrity of arbitration.
II. FEDERAL LABOR POLICY AND THE PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTION
In passing the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA),3 Con-
gress envisioned collective bargaining as a means of reducing indus-
trial strife,34 thereby promoting continuity of production. In three
cases collectively known as the Steelworkers Trilogy,35 the Supreme
Court secured arbitration's position as the cornerstone of this system
of "industrial self-government." 36 Building upon a body of federal
common law of labor relations, 37 the Court sought in the Trilogy to
encourage the final resolution of workplace disputes through griev-
ance arbitration by imposing strict limitations on the ability of parties
to a collective agreement to challenge arbitrators' decisions in the
courts. In United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufactur-
ing Co., 38 the Court held that, as long as employers and unions pro-
vide for arbitration, judges must order them to arbitrate all
33. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-160 (1982); see supra note 1.
34. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982); see NLRB v. American Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 401 (1952);
see also First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 674 (1980) (The fundamental
aim of the NLRA was to establish and maintain industrial peace to preserve the flow of
interstate commerce.); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962)
(Ordering and adjusting of competing interests through collective bargaining is central to
promoting industrial peace.); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 488
(1960) (Imposing a mutual duty upon employers and unions to bargain in good faith will
promote Congress' goal of securing industrial peace.); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 45 (1937) (The theory underlying the NLRA is that free negotiation with
employees' representatives will promote industrial peace.).
35. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v: Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). The Court
acknowledged that collective bargaining creates "a new common law-the common law of a
particular industry or a particular plant." Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 579. For further
discussion of the Steelworkers Trilogy in the context of judicial review, see Kaden, supra note
12 and St. Antoine, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise
Wheel and its Progeny, 75 MIcH. L. REV. 1137 (1977).
36. Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 580.
37. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
38. 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
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unresolved disputes, including those the judge believes to be frivo-
lous.39 In United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co.,4  the Court established a presumption of arbitrability if
coverage of a particular dispute under an arbitration clause is in
doubt.4 Collective bargaining, the Court observed, enables unions
and employers to govern their relationship according to an "agreed-
upon rule of law"42 rather than by ad hoe resolutions that depend
upon their relative strength.43 The Court concluded that the arbitra-
tion process replaces a "regime of industrial conflict"" with a
"regime of peaceful settlement,"4 5 and that courts, therefore, should
promote its operation.46
The importance of promoting the finality of arbitration led to a
corresponding doctrine that restricted judicial review of the merits of
arbitrators' decisions. The Supreme Court developed this doctrine in
the third Trilogy case, United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp.47 In Enterprise, an employer fired a group of
employees who had left their jobs to protest the firing of another
employee. Their union presented their grievances to the proper man-
agement channels and ultimately, after their grievances were not satis-
factorily resolved, they submitted the dispute to arbitration. The
arbitrator awarded the employees reinstatement with backpay, but the
employer refused to comply.48 Subsequently, the union sought
enforcement of the arbitrator's order in federal district court, and
although the district court enforced the arbitrator's award, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the district
39. The Court reasoned that "[t]he processing of even frivolous claims may have
therapeutic values of which those who are not a part of the [workplace] may be quite
unaware." Id. at 568 (citing Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
ROCKY MTN. L. REV. 526 (1958)).
40. 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
41. Id. at 582-83. The Court emphasized the unique role of arbitration in labor relations
by distinguishing the different purposes it serves in resolving disputes over commercial
contracts and collective agreements. Parties to commercial contracts resort to arbitration and
the courts only when their working relationship has broken down. In contrast, the Court
emphasized that the relationship between the parties to a collective agreement is a continuing
one, and they therefore have no choice but to deal with one another. Thus the grievance
procedures in the labor context are "actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given
to the collective bargaining agreement." Warrior & Gulf, 363 U.S. at 581.
42. Id. at 580.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 585.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
48. Id. at 595.
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court's decision.49 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the
Court of Appeals,5 ° holding that "[t]he federal labor policy of settling
labor disputes by arbitration would be circumvented if courts had the
final say on the merits of the awards."'" The Court reasoned that to
hold otherwise would undermine the foundation of collective
bargaining:
[T]he question of interpretation of the collective bargaining agree-
ment is a question for the arbitrator. It is the arbitrator's construc-
tion which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's decision
concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is differ-
ent from his.
52
Despite the Court's strong support for deference to arbitration, its
opinion contained a caveat: An arbitrator's award is "legitimate only
so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement.
53
The Supreme Court recognized the public policy exception to the
Steelworkers Trilogy requirement of deference to arbitrators' decisions
in Grace.54 In Grace, the employer had entered into a voluntary con-
ciliation agreement with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission to correct prior Title VII violations.5 This conciliation
agreement required Grace to maintain the existing proportion of
women in the plant in the event of a layoff.56 The terms of the concili-
ation agreement, however, violated the seniority provisions of its col-
lective agreement with the union.57 During a subsequent layoff of
several employees, Grace complied with the conciliation agreement.5 8
The union presented a grievance on behalf of the discharged employ-
ees and subsequently submitted its grievance to arbitration. The arbi-
trator concluded that, although Grace had made the layoffs in good
49. Id. at 595-96.
50. Id. at 599.
51. Id. at 596. In the years since the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Supreme Court has carved
out two express exceptions allowing courts to engage in de novo review of grievances after
arbitration. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (Parties may litigate a
discharge upheld in arbitration de novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.);
Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976) (Employees may sue their employer
and union if the grievance procedure has failed due to the union's bad faith representation.).
52. Enterprise, 363 U.S. at 599.
53. Id. at 597. At least one critic has challenged this caveat for its vagueness. See Kaden,
supra note 12, at 270-71.
54. 461 U.S. 757 (1983). Title VII protects employees against discriminatory attitudes and
behavior in the workplace. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982).
55. Id. at 759-60.
56. Id. at 760.
57. Id. at 760-61.
58. Id. at 761.
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faith compliance with the conciliation agreement, the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained no exception for good faith violations of
its seniority provisions.59 Thus the arbitrator ordered Grace to pay
damages to the employees in the form of backpay but did not order
reinstatement. 6° Grace instituted an action in federal district court to
overturn the award, and the district court entered summary judgment
for Grace. The union appealed the district court's order to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which reversed the dis-
trict court's decision.6'
The Supreme Court granted Grace's petition for a writ of certio-
rari.62 Grace contended that the Court should vacate the arbitrator's
award because it violated the public policies of encouraging both obe-
dience to court orders63 and voluntary compliance with Title VII.64
In determining that Grace's arguments were insufficient to justify
overturning the arbitrator's award,65 the Court enunciated the public
policy exception:
As with any contract, ... a court may not enforce a collective-
bargaining agreement that is contrary to public policy .... [T]he
question of public policy is ultimately one for resolution by the
courts .... If the contract as interpreted [by the arbitrator] vio-
lates some explicit public policy, we are obliged to refrain from
enforcing it. Such a public policy, however, must be well defined
and dominant, and is to be ascertained "by reference to the laws
and legal precedents and not from general considerations of sup-
59. Id. at 769.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 764.
62. 458 U.S. 1105 (1982) (granting Grace's petition for a writ of certiorari).
63. Although later reversed, a federal district court had ordered the employer, the union,
and the EEOC to abide by the conciliation agreement. Grace, 461 U.S. at 761. Grace argued
that the arbitrator's decision to make Grace pay damages was a disincentive to obey the court
order. Id. at 767.
64. Congress intended voluntary compliance to be the preferred means of enforcing Title
VII. Id. at 770-71.
65. Id. The Court's decision to uphold the arbitrator's award seems to have been a
relatively simple one considering the equities of the case. Grace had voluntarily entered both
agreements, although they were inconsistent with each other, and then attempted to allocate
the burdens of its actions to its employees, who shared no responsibility for the Title VII
violations. The Court reasoned that "[n]o public policy is violated by holding the Company to
[its] obligations, which bar the Company's attempted reallocation of the burden." Id. at 770.
The underlying rationale for the Court's decision may actually have been the reaffirmation of
the Steelworkers Trilogy's recognition of the uniqueness of collective relationships. The Court
stated: "Although the ability to abrogate unilaterally the provisions of a collective-bargaining
agreement might encourage an employer to conciliate with the [Equal Employment
Opportunity] Commission, the employer's added incentive to conciliate would be paid for with
the union's contractual rights." Id. at 771.
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posed public interests.",66
The language the Court used to describe the public policy excep-
tion, however, was sufficiently vague to permit courts interpreting it
to show less deference to arbitrators' decisions. First, the opinion's
"[a]s with any contract" language could imply that employers need
only allege a violation of public policy to cause courts to abandon
their deferential standard of review and to treat collective agreements
as ordinary contracts. 67 Second, the opinion's "well defined and dom-
inant" language provides only a vague notion of what constitutes suf-
ficiently clear public policy to justify courts in disturbing the finality
of arbitration decisions.
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ARBITRATION
DECISIONS AFTER Grace
A. The Entitlement to Rehabilitation
Although employers may lawfully reinstate impaired workers
voluntarily, an employer who elects to do so may encounter tort lia-
bility for any injuries that the impaired worker inflicts on another
after reinstatement.68 In contracting to be bound by an arbitrator's
decision, however, an employer relinquishes control over the question
of reinstatement and its accompanying financial risks to an impartial
66. Id. at 766 (quoting Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 66 (1945) and citing Hurd
v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35 (1948)). The Court in Muschany continued, "It is a matter of
public importance that good faith contracts . . . should not be lightly invalidated. Only
dominant public policy would justify such an action." Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66.
67. Under general principles of contract law, courts will not enforce contracts if some
public policy outweighs the public interest in freedom of contract. See, e.g., Anaconda Federal
Credit Union #4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175, 178, 483 P.2d 909, 911 (1971); Sternaman v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 170 N.Y. 13, 19, 62 N.E. 763, 764 (N.Y. 1902); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 22-1 (3d ed. 1987); E. FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 5.1 (1982). As
the Steelworkers Trilogy indicates, however, collective bargaining agreements are not ordinary
contracts. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
68. Under certain circumstances, an employer may be liable to third persons for injuries
inflicted upon them by his employee. If the employee commits the tort within the scope of his
employment, liability is often based on the theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
An alternative theory of liability most likely to be raised in the impairment context is the
employer's primary negligence in hiring or retaining an incompetent or unfit employee. See
Cramer v. Housing Opportunities Comm'n, 304 Md. 705, 713, 501 A.2d 35, 40 (1985); Evans
v. Morsell, 284 Md. 160, 164-65, 395 A.2d 480, 483 (1978); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556,
562, 46 N.W.2d 382, 385 (1951); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Investments, 331 N.W.2d 907, 912-13
(Minn. 1983); DiCosala v. Kay, 91 N.J. 159, 170-71, 450 A.2d 508, 516 (1982); F & T Co. v.
Woods, 92 N.M. 697, 699, 594 P.2d 745, 747 (1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§ 213; Comment, Negligent Hiring and Negligent Entrustment: The Case Against Exclusion,
52 OR. L. REV. 296 (1973); Note, Employer Liable for Negligent Hiring After Cursory
Investigation of a Prospective Employee, 19 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 371 (1984).
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third party.6 9 When reviewing an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an
impaired worker, courts applying public policy considerations can, in
effect, reallocate those risks in the employer's favor by reversing the
arbitrator. An employer thus will have a strong incentive to support
an expansive interpretation of the public policy exception if an arbi-
trator orders the reinstatement of an impaired worker.
Arbitrators awarding reinstatement to impaired workers in effect
grant them an "entitlement to rehabilitation ' 7° by providing them a
second chance to prove their worth to their employer. The employer
must then absorb the costs of protecting both the workplace and the
public from workers whose judgment the employer now questions.
Assuming that the employer adheres to its agreement with the union
and accepts the arbitrator's order, it faces two choices: First, the
employer may place the employee in his original or a similar posi-
tion,71 insure against potential tort liability,72 and insist that the
worker abstain from the objectionable behavior. Second, the
employer may invest in rehabilitating the worker through an
employee assistance program.73
69. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 808 F.2d 76, 83 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S. March 26, 1987) (No. 86-1548).
70. See Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability One
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). Calabresi and Melamed's article
enunciates the concept of "entitlement":
The first issue which must be faced by any legal system is one we call the
problem of "entitlement." Whenever a state is presented with the conflicting
interests of two or more people, or two or more groups of people, it must decide
which side to favor. Absent such a decision, access to goods, services, and life
itself will be decided on the basis of "might makes right"-whoever is stronger or
shrewder will win. Hence the fundamental thing that law does is to decide which
of the conflicting parties will be entitled to prevail. The entitlement to make
noise versus the entitlement to have silence, the entitlement to pollute versus the
entitlement to breathe clean air, the entitlement to have children versus the
entitlement to forbid them-these are the first order of legal decisions.
Id. at 1090 (footnote omitted). Similarly, an arbitrator must decide between the conflicting
interests of the employer, who wants efficiency and productivity, and the impaired worker,
who wants continued employment. In awarding reinstatement, the arbitrator gives the
impaired worker, in essence, a revocable right to a second chance at proving his value to the
employer.
71. But cf United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d 822,
825 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding reinstatement of a postal clerk convicted of embezzling
inappropriate, even if to a different position).
72. For a discussion of employers' potential liability in the impaired worker context, see
supra note 68.
73. Many employers have introduced employee assistance programs (EAP's) as a means of
confronting substance abuse in the workplace. Approximately 5,000 American companies
currently offer their employees some sort of assistance in fighting impairments such as alcohol
and drug abuse. See Lyons, EAPs: The Only Real Cure for Substance Abuse, 76 MGMT. REV.
38, 38 (1987). These programs result in higher productivity, higher morale, lower absentee
rates, and lower hiring and training costs. For further discussion of substance abuse in the
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If the employer is dissatisfied with the arbitrator's order, it may
seek to correct that decision in one of two ways. The employer may
abide by the award and seek to prevent the recurrence of similar
awards from within the collective bargaining system either by bar-
gaining for more discretion over dismissal,74 or by selecting arbitra-
tors more cautiously in the future.75 The employer may also choose
to reject the award and look to the courts to correct the immediate
situation on the ground that reinstating the employee would violate
public policy. Such a contention presents the court with a dilemma:
To what extent should the court impose its authority upon the situa-
tion from outside the collective bargaining context? The following
section discusses this issue by tracing the approaches the federal
courts have taken when considering whether to apply the public pol-
icy exception.
B. Public Policy and Judicially Imposed Limitations
on Reinstatement
Federal courts agree that if it is unlawful for an employer to
choose voluntarily to reinstate an impaired worker,7 6 the courts
should vacate any arbitrator's award that compels reinstatement.
There is a split among the federal circuits, however, arising out of
Grace's "well defined and dominant" language regarding whether
courts should vacate an arbitrator's reinstatement order on public pol-
icy grounds if reinstatement by the employer would not be illegal.77
workplace and strategies for controlling it, see generally, SCANLON, ALCOHOLISM AND DRUG
ABUSE IN THE WORKPLACE (1986); CORPORATE STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE (H. Axel ed. 1986); COUNSELING THE TROUBLED PERSON IN INDUSTRY
(J. Dickman, W. Emener & W. Hutchinson eds. 1985).
74. See Northwest Airlines, 808 F.2d at 83-84. For a discussion of Northwest Airlines, see
infra note 82.
75. Published copies of prior opinions which are accessible to both parties enable them to
search for an arbitrator who has handled similar situations in the past. See F. ELKOURI & E.
ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 414-15.
76. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
77. Before the Supreme Court articulated Grace's "well defined and dominant"
requirement, courts applied general public policy principles in reviewing arbitrators' decisions.
See, e.g. Local No. P-1236, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jones Dairy Farm, 680 F.2d 1142
(7th Cir. 1982) (arbitrator's decision upholding a company rule that prohibited contacting
United States Department of Agriculture inspectors vacated as against public policy);
Amalgamated Transit Union v. Aztec Bus Lines, 654 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981) (court refused
to vacate an arbitrator's decision, concluding that two week suspension without pay of a bus
driver who demonstrated bad judgment was appropriate rather than outright dismissal on
public policy grounds); Washington-Baltimore Newspaper Guild, Local 35 v. Washington
Post Co., 442 F.2d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (arbitrators' awards will not be vacated, even for
errors of fact and law, unless they compel violation of law or conduct contrary to public
policy).
[Vol. 42:767
1988] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION 781
The federal courts of appeal have developed a variety of
approaches to the public policy exception. Courts that interpret the
exception narrowly will vacate only those arbitrators' awards order-
ing reinstatements that would be illegal.7 8 Courts that interpret the
exception more expansively look beyond mere illegality to overturn
those reinstatements that violate more expansive notions of workplace
safety and public welfare. 79 Although most courts use statutes, regula-
tions, and precedent in their efforts to identify public policy, the diver-
gence of approaches indicates that what qualifies as public policy may
often depend upon the individual decisionmaker's point of view.8°
Under the narrow interpretation of the exception's scope, 81 statutes
and regulations must expressly address reinstatement before they are
sufficiently "well defined and dominant" to justify overturning an
arbitrator's decision. Under the more expansive interpretation, stat-
utes and regulations need only address the workplace or criminal
behavior generally to enable courts to craft a public policy that justi-
fies reversal.82 This split among the circuits reflects the vague nature
of the public policy exception established in Grace. The case analyses
that follow demonstrate the extent to which this exception has per-
mitted courts to play an expanding role in policing grievance
arbitration.
1. THE NARROW INTERPRETATION OF Grace: ILLEGALITY
Courts adhering to a narrow approach to the public policy excep-
tion are reluctant to reverse an arbitrator's decision to reinstate an
impaired worker.83 The opinions of these courts generally have
78. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1986); see infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
79. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great Western Food Co.,
712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983); see infra notes 105-86 and accompanying text.
80. The same difficulty exists in the realm of general contract law. In his treatise on
contracts, Corbin wrote, "In thousands of cases contracts have been declared to be illegal on
the ground that they are contrary to public policy; and those two alliterative words are often
used as if they had a magic quality and were self-explanatory. What is 'public policy' and who
knows what it requires? Does a judge know this, merely by virtue of becoming a judge?" A.
CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1375 (abr. ed. 1952).
81. See infra notes 83-104 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 105-44 and accompanying text.
83. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir.
1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1987) (No. 86-1548); American
Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.
1982) (vacating as illegal the reinstatement of postal worker discharged for striking), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1200 (1983). From the post-Grace case of Bevies Company, Inc. v. Teamsters
Local 986, it appears that the Ninth Circuit may be a narrow-Grace jurisdiction. 791 F.2d
1391 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). In Bevies, the Ninth Circuit
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emphasized the particular facts of each impaired worker's case and
the ability of the union and employer to resolve their disputes in the
manner best suited to the needs of their particular relationship. 4
This view recognizes the individual's entitlement to rehabilitation and
encourages employers and unions to make adjustments for the future
through collective bargaining rather than through the submission of
their disputes to the judicial system. Courts that have adopted these
principles will not reverse an arbitrator's order for reinstatement
unless a statute or regulation expressly addressing the workplace
makes reinstatement illegal.85
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit has been the leading advocate of this limited approach to the
public policy exception. In American Postal Workers Union v. United
States Postal Service, 6 a postal clerk confessed to misappropriating
postal funds after a postal inspector interrogated him without advis-
ing him of his constitutional rights.8 7 Following the investigation, the
Postal Inspection Service removed the clerk, who was subsequently
indicted.8 8 The trial judge excluded the confession because of the
inspector's failure to administer the proper warnings during the inves-
tigation. 9 A jury subsequently acquitted the clerk.90 The clerk's
union filed a grievance on behalf of the clerk under its collective
agreement with the Postal Service and ultimately invoked its right
to submit the dispute to arbitration.91 The arbitrator also excludedthe clerk's confession 92 and ordered the Postal Service to reinstate
considered whether it should, in light of public policy, vacate an arbitrator's reinstatement of
two known illegal aliens with backpay. Although not expressly articulating its view of the
public policy exception's scope, the court restricted its search for public policy to statutes and
cases addressing employer liability for hiring illegal aliens. Bevies, 791 F.2d at 1391. Thus the
Ninth Circuit, implicitly at least, has accepted an approach to the public policy exception
similar to that of the D.C. Circuit.
84. See, e.g., Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 808 F.2d 76 (D.C.
Cir. 1987), petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1987) (No. 86-1548).
85. See, e.g., American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 789 F.2d 1
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
86. 789 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
87. American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 118 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2472, 2473 (D.D.C. 1985). The Inspection Service failed to inform the clerk of his
constitutional rights as required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
88. Id. The clerk was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 500 (1982), which forbids conversion or
misappropriation of postal funds. Id.
89. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 3.
90. American Postal Workers, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2473.
91. Id.
92. Id. The collective bargaining agreement between the Postal Service and the union
provided that the discharge of Postal Service employees had to be "consistent with applicable
laws and regulations." American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 6. Thus the court of appeals
held that the arbitrator clearly had jurisdiction to apply Miranda to the dispute. Id.
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him.93 The Postal Service refused to comply with the decision and the
union sought enforcement of the award in federal district court. 94
The district court granted the Postal Service's motion for summary
judgment and refused to enforce the arbitrator's reinstatement
order. "
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit addressed the issue of whether pub-
lic policy justified the district court's refusal to enforce the arbitrator's
award.96 The court held that it did not, emphasizing that collective
bargaining creates a "constitution of industrial self-government'"" in
which the arbitrator plays an integral role.98 Disturbing the results of
arbitration, the court reasoned, would undermine a substantial basis
of the parties' bargain, 99 yet refusing to intervene would not leave the
parties without a remedy. "The parties' remedy in such cases is the
same remedy they possess whenever they are not satisfied with the
arbitrator's performance of his or her job: negotiate a modification of
the contract or hire a new arbitrator." 100
The court rejected the Postal Service's contention that the com-
pulsory reinstatement of the clerk would violate public policy.1"' In
so holding, the court articulated what it perceived to be the proper
scope of Grace: Courts must interpret Grace's "well defined and
dominant" language narrowly in order to prevent "potentially intru-
sive" 102 judicial review of arbitrators' decisions in the name of public
policy. 0 3 The court argued that "judges have no license to impose
their own brand of justice in determining applicable public policy;
thus, the exception applies only when the public policy emanates from
clear statutory or case law, 'not from general considerations of sup-
posed public interests.' "I'
93. American Postal Workers, 789 F.2d at 4.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Id. at 5.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7 (citing Feller, supra at note 1).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 766 (quoting Muschany, 324 U.S. at 66)) (emphasis
omitted). In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Association, the D.C. Circuit
reiterated the importance of interpreting Grace narrowly. 808 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
petition for cert. filed, 56 U.S.L.W. 3045 (U.S. Mar. 26, 1987) (No. 86-1548). In Northwest
Airlines, the airline dismissed a pilot who flew while intoxicated in violation of an airline work
rule that prohibited drinking within twenty-four hours of a scheduled flight. Id. at 78.
Finding that the pilot could be rehabilitated, the arbitrator ordered Northwest to reinstate him
without backpay or benefits if the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air surgeon
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2. EXPANDING Grace: JUDICIAL CONCERNS FOR WORKPLACE
SAFETY AND PUBLIC WELFARE
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, other courts have interpreted
Grace's "well defined and dominant" language more expansively and
are therefore more inclined to reverse an arbitrator's decision to rein-
state an impaired worker.'05 Their focus is not on rehabilitating the
individual, but rather on a perceived need to deter irresponsible
behavior.' 6 As a result, these courts more readily extract public poli-
cies prohibiting reinstatement from laws and regulations that do not
expressly address the issue.
A more expansive interpretation of Grace raises an additional
concern: To what extent should courts be required to justify the pub-
lic policy grounds on which they overturn arbitrators' reinstatement
decisions? Courts that interpret Grace more expansively generally
will present statutes or regulations that loosely support their under-
standing of public policy. '07 Furthermore, they often justify a decision
recertified him as fully rehabilitated and capable of flying. Id. at 79. The air surgeon
recertified the pilot, and Northwest sought to overturn the arbitrator's decision. A federal
district court set aside the award as a threat to the public policy of air safety. Id. at 80.
The Court of Appeals rejected Northwest's contention that reinstating the pilot violated
public policy because Northwest could point to no statute or regulation prohibiting
reinstatement under the circumstances. In one sense, the court faced a fairly easy case. The
pilot's reinstatement was contingent upon the FAA recertifying him as capable of flying. Thus
the court's decision had two grounds: deference to the arbitrator and deference to an
administrative agency. Id. at 83. The court stated that granting Northwest's request would
disrupt the existing relationship between it and the union:
[I]t is not the role of the courts to alter the labor-management balance struck in
the collective bargaining agreement. Northwest is free to negotiate with [the Air
Line Pilots Association] to remove the application of safety rules from the
jurisdiction of the Board or to reduce the amount of discretion given to the Board
on such matters.
Id. at 83-84. The court offered Northwest an alternative: It could lobby the FAA or Congress
for a change in the objectionable statutes and regulations. Id.
105. See Stead Motor of Walnut Creek v. Automobile Machinists Lodge No. 1173, No. 87-
2053 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 1988); Iowa Elec. & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987); Premium Building Products Co. v. United
Steelworkers of Am., No. 85-3749, slip op. (6th Cir. July 15, 1986); S.D. Warren Co. v. United
Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded,
108 S. Ct. 497 (1987); Misco v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir.
1985), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987); United States Postal Service v. American Postal Workers
Union, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984); Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great
Western Food Co., 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983); cf. United States Postal Service v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987)
(arbitrator's reinstatement of compulsive gambler with mental problems who failed to deliver
over 3,500 pieces of mail held to violate public policy); E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli
Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986) (arbitrator's
reinstatement of employee who suffered a mental breakdown held not to violate public policy).
106. See supra cases cited note 105.
107. See infra notes 117-27, 139-42 & 191 and accompanying text.
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to overturn an arbitrator on "common sense."' 8 Each of these deci-
sions has precedential or persuasive value upon which the next court
facing the issue can build. 109 As long as courts continue to build upon
prior case law, the exception's scope may continue to expand. Too
expansive an interpretation, however, may eventually reduce Grace's
''well defined and dominant" language to a mere tautology.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was one
of the first courts to interpret Grace's public policy exception more
expansively. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters, Local Union 540 v. Great
Western Food Co., " 0 a professional driver was involved in an accident
in which his truck overturned. 1 ' The highway patrolman who
arrived on the scene noted a strong smell of liquor on the driver's
breath, and the officer issued citations for both drinking while on duty
and speeding." 2 The driver admitted to the officer that he had taken
a drink at a rest stop before his accident. "3 As a result of this inci-
dent, Great Western discharged the driver. Pursuant to its collective
bargaining agreement with the employer, the driver's union filed a
grievance and subsequently submitted its grievance to arbitration."
14
The arbitrator ordered Great Western to reinstate the driver because
it had failed to investigate the driver's claim that a mechanical failure,
not his drinking, had caused the accident." 5 Upon Great Western's
refusal to reinstate the driver, the union sought and won enforcement
of the order in federal district court."
16
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
public policy mandated that the court reverse the arbitrator's
award." 7 The court asserted that "[i]n a nation where motorists
practically live on the highways, no citation of authority is required to
establish that an arbitration award ordering a company to reinstate an
over-the-road truck driver caught drinking liquor on duty violates
public policy.""'  Three separate factors convinced the court that
vital public policy concerns were at issue:' '9 (1) the prevalence of laws
108. See infra notes 124, 128, 143-44 & 161 and accompanying text.
109. See infra notes 110-44 and accompanying text.
110. 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983).




115. Id. at 123-24. The arbitrator refused to award the driver backpay, however, because
he admitted to drinking shortly before his accident. Id.
116. Id. at 123.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 124.
119. Although the court based its construction of public policy upon these three general
considerations, none of them directly addressed the immediate issue: whether the arbitrator
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against drunk driving that, in the court's estimation, "become even
more compelling" if the driver is a paid professional; 20 (2) case law
supporting the discharge of employees who have failed to demonstrate
the judgment skills required by their jobs;12 ' and (3) the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, 122 which prohibit professional
drivers from driving on duty within four hours of consuming alco-
hol.123 In addition, the court claimed that "pure common sense" dic-
tated against reinstatement. 124 The court concluded that the policy of
preventing drinking and driving was "well defined and definite"'
125
and precluded the arbitrator's decision to order reinstatement.
126
The Fifth Circuit thus established a more expansive interpreta-
tion of Grace's "well defined and dominant" language, and in turn,
created a public policy exception less deferential to arbitration than
that of the D.C. Circuit. Under the Fifth Circuit's analysis, courts
can formulate public policy from laws or regulations that do not
address reinstatement if the employee's wrongful act appears to the
court to relate to his job duties in some manner.' 2 ' The court also
diminished judicial deference to arbitration by legitimating common
sense as a valid justification for overturning an arbitrator's reinstate-
ment order on public policy grounds.
12 8
Subsequent cases have both followed and expanded Great West-
could reinstate the driver. It is ironic to note that, though Great Western was free to reinstate
the driver if it had wished, an arbitrator, to whom Great Western willingly gave up control
over reinstatement in its collective agreement, could not make the same decision.
120. Great Western, 712 F.2d at 124.
121. NLRB v. Dixie Motor Coach Corp., 128 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1942); accord NLRB v.
United States Trucking Co;, 124 F.2d 887, 889-90 (6th Cir. 1942); World Airways, Inc. v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 2707, 578 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1978); Texas Co. v.
NLRB, 120 F.2d 186, 187-88 (9th Cir. 1941).
122. 49 C.F.R. §§ 350.1-99.211 (1987). These regulations also prohibit motor carriers from
requiring or permitting drivers who have consumed or appear to have consumed alcohol to
drive within four hours of drinking.
123. Id.
124. Great Western, 712 F.2d at 125.
125. Id.
126. Deterrence clearly motivated the court, which emphasized "the public policy of
preventing people from drinking and driving." Id. Although it is less than clear that the
interest in deterrence prohibits arbitrators from reinstating a driver already punished by
suspension during the course of litigation, courts may decide differently under Grace's
articulation of the public policy exception. Cf Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. Teamsters Local
Union, No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 125 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984) (citing
Great Western for the proposition that it is a violation of public policy to reinstate professional
drivers whose intoxication causes an accident).
127. The court, for example, referred generally to laws against drunk driving, finding them
to be "even more compelling" in light of the driver's job responsibilities. See Great Western,
712 F.2d at 124.
128. Id. at 125.
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ern's approach. In United States Postal Service v. American Postal
Workers Union,'2 9 the Postal Service discharged a clerk convicted of
misappropriating postal funds. 130 The union sought the clerk's rein-
statement, and ultimately submitted its grievance to arbitration. The
arbitrator reinstated the clerk, focusing on the clerk's financial pres-
sures, his evidenced intent to repay the money, and his good employ-
ment history.' 3' A district court vacated'the award, and the United
States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed the decision.'32
The First Circuit all but ignored the mitigating circumstances sur-
rounding the clerk's criminal activity, emphasizing instead the Postal
Service's general statutory duty to be "prompt, reliable, and efficient"
in its service to the public. 133 Public policy, the court held, could not
condone reinstating a convicted felon, even to a position no longer
involving the handling of money or stamps. 134
The union framed the issue according to the narrow interpreta-
tion of Grace, arguing that, although there may be a public policy
against misappropriating postal funds, there is no public policy
129. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984). As previously discussed, the federal circuits appear
divided on the impact postal employees' hybrid nature should have upon judicial scrutiny of
arbitral reinstatement of impaired workers. See supra note 1. The D.C. Circuit case of
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service reveals that circuit's tendency
to maintain the same deference to the arbitrator in the postal context as it does in private
sector cases. See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text. In contrast, the case discussed in
this section of the text reveals the First Circuit's tendency to engage in stricter scrutiny of
arbitral reinstatement of impaired postal workers in light of their employment by a federal
agency.
The Supreme Court of the United States has granted certiorari in a third postal workers
case, United States Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239
(D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987). The Court will decide "[wlhether an
arbitration award ordering the Postal Service to reinstate an employee who has been
discharged for, and criminally convicted of, failing to deliver thousands of pieces of mail
should be set aside as contrary to public policy." Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit at I, United States Postal
Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert.
granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987) (No. 87-59). In its disposition of the case, the D.C. Circuit
refused to overturn an arbitrator's reinstatement of an emotionally disturbed, compulsive
gambler who failed to deliver over 3,500 pieces of mail over the course of eighteen months.
The arbitrator reinstated him after a sixty day suspension conditioned upon his good faith
participation in Gambler's Anonymous and abstention from gambling. Letter Carriers, 810
F.2d at 1240 n.3. In its petition for certiorari, the United States Postal Service argued that the
scope of the public policy exception must be correspondingly greater in light of the Service's
"public mission" to provide "prompt, reliable, and efficient" mail delivery. Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 10-11, United States Postal Service v. National Association of Letter Carriers,
810 F.2d 1239 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 500 (1987) (No. 87-59).
130. United States Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 823.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 824.
133. Id. at 825-26.
134. Id. at 825.
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against the Postal Service employing persons convicted of doing so.' 35
The court, however, rejected this interpretation.'36 Citing Great
Western, it stated that such a precise fit between the facts of the case
and the public policy at issue was not necessary. 137 The court thus
concluded that general public policy could be sufficient to vacate an
arbitrator's award, regardless of the merits of the individual
employee's case. '38
The court also rejected the proposition that criminal sanctions
sufficiently vindicate the public interest in deterring criminal behav-
ior.' 9 First, applying the Fifth Circuit's analytical approach, 4 ° it
asserted that misappropriation went to the heart of the employee's
responsibilities as both a money handler and a public employee
charged with the "public trust."' 4' The court based its decision on
statutes relating to the conduct expected of postal employees: specifi-
cally, the Service's general duty of reliability and the postal workers'
oath. 4 2 Second, "the clear dictates of common sense"' 143 provided an
equally strong rationale against reinstatement:
[W]e cannot avoid the common sense implications that requiring
the rehiring of [the discharged employee] would have on other pos-
tal employees and on the public in general. Other postal employees
may feel there is less reason for them to be honest than they
believed-the Union could always fix it if they were caught. More-
over, the public trust in the Postal Service, and in the entire federal
government, could be diminished by the idea that graft is
condoned.'"




139. See Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers v. Otis Elevator Co., 314 F.2d 25 (2nd
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963).
140. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
141. United States Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 825.
142. Id. The court based its reasoning on several provisions of the Postal Reorganization
Act relating to the conduct expected of postal employees and on a federal criminal statute
prohibiting fraudulent use of money orders:
A postal employee is required to swear that he "will well and faithfully discharge
the duties of the office on which [he is] about to enter." Numerous statutes relate
to the conduct and honesty of postal employees-among them is 18 U.S.C. § 500,
the statute under which [the employee] was convicted. Moreover, the Postal
Service is required by law to be "prompt, reliable, and efficient .... " Finally, as
a government monopoly, the public has to use the Postal Service for the carriage
of regular letter mail.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 39 U.S.C. §§ 101(a), 1011).
143. Id.; see supra note 124 and accompanying text.
144. Id.; cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Grasselli Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611, 616-17
(7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 186 (1986). Similar to National Association of Letter
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The court thus concluded that the arbitrator's award could not stand.
Like Great Western, the case of Iowa Electric & Power Co. v.
Local Union 204, International Brotherhood of Teamsters'45 reflects
judicial concern for the threat that impaired workers pose to public
safety. The employee discharged in Iowa Electric worked in a
machine shol' in the secondary containment area of a nuclear power
plant, a buffer area designed to prevent the spread of any radiation
released from the core of the nuclear reactor. 14 6 Because the employee
had a broken leg, he tried to exit through one of the containment
system doors in order to avoid the lunch rush one afternoon. 147 After
learning that the door was properly locked because another door was
open, 148 the employee requested permission to unlock the door. The
control room engineer denied the request. Nevertheless, the employee
opened the door in violation of federally mandated safety regula-
tions. 4 9 Iowa Electric subsequently discharged him and reported the
incident to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 50 The NRC
issued an inspection report approving the discharge and reprimanding
Iowa Electric for the violation. 5 ' The employee's union filed a griev-
ance on his behalf and subsequently submitted the grievance to
arbitration. '52
The arbitrator found that the employee's act was deliberate and
thoughtless, but determined that his termination was an inappropri-
ately severe form of discipline under. the circumstances.153 Although
the employee was aware of the general purpose of the containment
procedure and knew that he was not to disarm the system, the arbitra-
tor reasoned that the employee, perhaps, was not aware of the gravity
Carriers, DuPont differs from other cases discussed in this Comment in that it involved an
involuntarily impaired employee who suffered a mental breakdown at work. See supra note
129. An arbitrator ordered DuPont to reinstate the employee and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ultimately upheld the arbitrator's award. DuPont, 790 F.2d at
617. Similar to United States Postal Workers, however, the DuPont court based its decision on
the factual finding that reinstating the employee posed no threat to other workers. Id.
145. 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir. 1987).
146. Id. at 1425.
147. Id. at 1426.
148. Id. at 1425-26. The plant is equipped with a series of doors around the reactor area to
maintain air pressure. This system is designed to prevent the spread of radiation into the
atmosphere in the event of a leak. The doors are designed so that only one may be opened at a
time. If one door is open, a red light flashes beside the others, which are automatically
secured. The only way an employee can defeat the automatic lock system is to have someone
outside the door pull a fuse. Id.
149. Id. at 1426.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1428.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1426.
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of doing so.154 The arbitrator therefore ordered Iowa Electric to rein-
state the employee. Iowa Electric refused to obey the arbitrator's
order and brought an action in federal district court to overturn the
arbitrator's decision on the ground that it violated public policy. The
district court vacated the arbitrator's reinstatement award, and the
Eighth Circuit affirmed. 55
Emphasizing the public health and safety interests that the
employee's actions conceivably could have harmed, the court rejected
the narrow interpretation of the public policy exception. 156 The court
held that enforcing the arbitrator's reinstatement order would violate
the "strong public policy" of "strict adherence to nuclear safety
rules.' ' 157 In support of its holding, the court cited NRC regulations
that require nuclear power plant licensees to draft technical specifica-
tions to protect national security and public health and safety.
1 8
"Nothing could be plainer," the court stated, "than the public interest
in the safe operation of nuclear power plants that underlies this pano-
ply of federal regulations."' 59
In light of this public policy, the court concluded that reinstate-
ment would discourage strict compliance with nuclear safety regula-
tions. 160  Similar to other courts applying a more expansive
interpretation of the public policy exception, the Eighth Circuit seems
to have been concerned primarily with countering what it perceived
to be the lenient disposition of the grievance by the arbitrator. That
the employee's actions did not result in any actual harm to public
health was of no consequence in light of the harm that could have
arisen. Given the seriousness of the breach, the court could not avoid
the "common sense implications" that reinstating this employee
would have on other employees and the public.
16 1
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1425.
156. Id. at 1427 n.3. For a discussion of the narrow interpretation of the public policy
exception, see supra notes 84-105 and accompanying text.
157. Id. at 1427.
158. Id. at 1428. Specifically, the court cited 10 C.F.R. §§ 50.1-.110 (1987), which the
NRC promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2131-2141 (1982). Each plant, in turn, must
develop more detailed specifications and regulations in order to obtain and maintain its federal
license. Licensees must report violations to the NRC, which may issue enforcement penalties.
Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1428.
159. Iowa Electric, 834 F.2d at 1428 (quoting United States Postal Service v. American
Postal Workers Union, 736 F.2d at 825). In dicta, the court cautioned that its holding should
not be read as a blanket justification for discharging every employee who violates a nuclear
safety regulation. The violation in this case, the court stressed, was both serious and
intentional. Id. at 1429.
160. Id. at 1430.
161. Id. (quoting United States Postal Service, 736 F.2d at 825). In the recent case of Stead
Motor of Walnut Creek v. Automobile Machinists Lodge No. 1173, the United States Court of
[Vol. 42:767
1988] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO GRIEVANCE ARBITRATION 791
IV. United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco: THE
SUPREME COURT SETS THE EXCEPTION'S OUTER LIMIT
As interpreted by the federal courts, the "well defined and domi-
nant" language of the public policy exception has justified varying
degrees of judicial involvement in arbitration. Prompted by this divi-
sion among the circuits, the Supreme Court recently revisited the pub-
lic policy exception in United Paperworkers International Union v.
Misco. 162 In Misco, the Court explored the outer limit of the excep-
tion's scope, addressing whether a court's perception of public policy
may justify the rejection of the arbitrator's findings of fact.
163
The employee in Misco worked the night shift in a paper mill,
where he operated dangerous machinery. 164 While the employee was
at work one evening, local police searched his home pursuant to a
warrant, and found a substantial amount of marijuana. 6  An officer
who had been sent to watch the employee's car in Misco's parking lot
observed the employee and two coworkers leave the plant, enter the
employee's car briefly, and then enter another car. 166  The two
coworkers reentered the plant, and the police apprehended the
employee, who had remained in the back seat of the car. 167 There
were marijuana fumes in the car and a lit marijuana cigarette in a
front seat ashtray. 168 A subsequent search of the employee's car
revealed a box containing marijuana "gleanings.
' '1 6 9
The employee informed Misco that he had been arrested for pos-
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit followed the Eighth Circuit's analysis. No. 87-2053 (9th Cir.
Mar. 30, 1988). In Stead Motor, an arbitrator reinstated an automobile mechanic who had
been discharged for recklessly disregarding his foreman's instructions. The Ninth Circuit
overturned the reinstatement on the grounds that it conflicted with "well defined and
dominant" public policy. As grounds for its decision, the court cited California's broad
regulation of the automotive repair industry, which includes sanctions for the gross negligence
of automobile mechanics.
162. 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
163. In the cases discussed thus far, the courts, though ultimately vacating arbitrators'
reinstatement orders on public policy grounds, generally have respected the arbitrators'
findings of fact. For an express declaration of this standard of review in a somewhat different
context, see E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Ass'n, 790 F.2d 611 (7th
Cir. 1987). The DuPont court stated: "Where an arbitration award has been overturned on
public policy considerations, the court has not questioned the factual findings of the arbitrator.
Rather, the court has found that, assuming all of the facts found below are true, the
enforcement of the award will violate a public policy." Id. at 615.





169. Id. The employee ultimately pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana based on the
police search of his home. He was not prosecuted for possession of the marijuana cigarette
found in the car or for the marijuana gleanings found in his trunk. Id. n.3.
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sessing marijuana in his home.' 7° Misco did not learn of the mari-
juana cigarette in the car for another three days.' 17  Subsequently,
Misco discharged the employee pursuant to a company rule that pro-
hibited bringing controlled substances onto company premises and
reporting for work under their influence. 172 Misco had been con-
cerned that there was a drug problem on its night shift, and had repri-
manded the employee twice for errors in judgment in the performance
of his duties.7 3 At the time of discharge, however, Misco was not
aware that the police had found marijuana gleanings in the
employee's car. 174 The union filed a grievance and ultimately brought
the case to arbitration, at which time Misco first raised the issue of the
marijuana gleanings as support for its decision to discharge the
employee. '
5
The arbitrator's analysis of the dispute emphasized the absence
of sufficient evidence against the employee to constitute just cause for
the discharge. 176 First, the arbitrator determined that merely finding
the employee in the back seat of a car with a burning cigarette in the
ashtray was insufficient to prove that he had used or possessed mari-
juana on Misco's property. 177 Second, the arbitrator excluded from
evidence the marijuana found in the employee's car in Misco's lot
because Misco did not rely upon it when discharging the employee.
178
As a result, the arbitrator ordered Misco to reinstate the employee
with backpay and full seniority.1
9
Misco sought to vacate the arbitrator's award in federal district




174. Id. Indeed, Misco did not know of this until five days before the arbitration of the
employee's grievance took place. Id.
175. Id.; see infra note 178.
176. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 368-69.
177. Id. at 369 (citing Petition for A Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, app. D at 49a-50a, United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco,
Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) (No. 86-651) [hereinafter Petition for Certiorari]. The arbitrator
also noted that, despite having a clear view of the car at all times, the surveilling police officer
had not testified that he had seen the employee smoking marijuana. Id.
178. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 369. It is a standard practice among arbitrators to limit the
evidence to those facts known by the employer at the time of discipline. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at
371 n.8 (1987); see West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. International Bhd. of Pulp, Sulphite &
Paper Mill Workers, Local 508, 10 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 117, 118 (1947) (Guthrie, Arb.); F.
ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 675-77; 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 303-06 (1983).
179. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 368. Acknowledging that the employee had operated "hazardous"
machinery, the arbitrator gave Misco the option of reinstating him to the same position or a
similar one not involving dangerous machinery. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 177, at 53a.
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court. The district court set aside the reinstatement under the public
policy exception. 8 ° The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision,"' ruling that the arbitrator's reinstatement order violated
the public policy "against the operation of dangerous machinery by
persons under the influence of drugs or alcohol."'' 82 The Fifth Circuit
reached its conclusion by considering the evidence that the arbitrator
had excluded on due process grounds. The arbitrator's "narrow focus
on [the employee's] procedural rights" had led him to ignore some-
thing he "knew was in fact true: that [the employee] did bring mari-
juana onto his employer's premises."183 Furthermore, the court
stated, even if the arbitrator had not known all of the facts when he
rendered his decision, "it is doubtful that the award should be
enforced today in light of what is now known."'' 84 The Fifth Circuit's
approach represented the most expansive interpretation of the public
policy exception, a complete rejection of the Steelworkers Trilogy'
requirement of at least a modicum of judicial deference to
arbitration. '86
The Supreme Court rejected this "superarbitrator" approach to
180. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 768 F.2d 739, 741 (1985).




185. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960). See supra notes
35-53 and accompanying text.
186. Increased judicial involvement in arbitration on public policy grounds may take forms
other than overturning an arbitrator's decision. In Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers, Int'l
Union, Local No. 4-228 v. Union Oil Co. of California, the Fifth Circuit chose to remand a
grievance dispute to the arbitrator for a determination of whether to uphold the discharge of a
drug user on public policy grounds in light of positive drug tests administered after her
reinstatement. 818 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1987). The court remanded the case because the
arbitrator was in the best position to resolve the issue. Id. at 442. The court had authority to
remand the case under federal common law that has developed under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982); cf. Grand Rapids Die Casting
Corp. v. Local Union No. 159, 684 F.2d 413, 416 (6th Cir. 1982) (Remanding disputes for
clarification enables the court to avoid the "draconian choice" of upholding or reversing the
award.); Local 2222, 2320-27, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 628
F.2d 644, 647 (1st Cir. 1980) (Remanding disputes to arbitrators developed as a corollary to
courts' reluctance to interpret collective agreements.). In each of these cases, courts remanded
cases to arbitrators for clarification of an ambiguity in an award. In contrast, Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers remanded to the arbitrator for a de novo review of the merits of the discharge
of an impaired worker in light of public policy. 818 F.2d at 443.
Although remand may not have the same immediate impact on an arbitrator as would
vacating an award on public policy grounds, it may pose an equally serious threat to an
arbitrator's independent decisionmaking. Liberal use of the remand power would enable
courts to exercise more control over arbitral decisionmaking on a regular basis. Cf. United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Aurora Equip., 830 F.2d 753 (7th Cir. 1987) (A federal district court
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the public policy exception.' 87  Under the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
Court reasoned that if parties bargain for an arbitrator to resolve their
disputes, they agree to accept the arbitrator's view of the facts as part
of their bargain. This private agreement severely limits the role of the
courts in reviewing arbitration decisions. In reviewing an arbitrator's
decision, unlike reviewing lower court decisions, courts may not con-
sider claims that an arbitrator committed factual or legal errors.'88
The Court also reaffirmed the need for courts to defer to an arbitra-
tor's interpretation of the collective agreement, assessment of appro-
priate remedies, and consideration of the appropriate norms of due
process.' 89 Finally, the Court reiterated that courts need not defer to
an arbitrator's opinion if it fails to draw its essence from the collective
agreement. 19 0
The Court firmly rejected the Fifth Circuit's sweeping approach
to defining public policy:
The Court of Appeals made no attempt to review existing laws and
legal precedents in order to demonstrate that they establish a "well
defined and dominant" policy against the operation of dangerous
machinery while under the influence of drugs. Although certainly
such a judgment is firmly rooted in common sense, we explicitly
held in [Grace] that a formulation of public policy based only on
"general considerations of supposed public interests" is not the sort
that permits a court to set aside an arbitration award that was
entered in accordance with a valid collective-bargaining
agreement. 9'
order remanding a case to an arbitrator is not appealable because it is not a final order under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982)).
187. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 369.
188. The Court stated: "To resolve disputes about the application of a collective-bargaining
agreement, an arbitrator must find facts and a court may not reject those findings simply
because it disagrees with them." Id. at 370-71. The Court also stated in dicta that courts may
refuse to enforce decisions procured through a party's misrepresentations or an arbitrator's
dishonesty. In this case, however, the Court observed, "No dishonesty is alleged; only
improvident, even silly, factfinding is claimed. This is hardly sufficient basis for disregarding
what the agent appointed by the parties determined to be the historical facts." Id. at 371.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 372-73. The high degree of judicial deference to the arbitrator that the Court
envisioned is evident from its observation: "[A]s long as the arbitrator is even arguably
construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is
convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision." Id. at 371.
The Court's statement is an express affirmation of the high degree of judicial deference to
arbitration contained in the doctrine of the Steelworkers Trilogy. See supra notes 35-53 and
accompanying text.
191. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374 (quoting Grace, 461 U.S. at 766). The Court apparently did
not find it significant that the Misco panel referred in passing to the fact that bringing drugs
onto company premises was "in violation of Louisiana law." Misco, 768 F.2d at 743. The
court of appeals made no attempt, however, to integrate this passing reference into its asserted
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In its opinion, however, the Court expressly refused to address
whether courts may overturn an arbitrator's reinstatement order on
public policy grounds that fall short of illegality.'92  Justice Black-
mun, in a concurrence in which Justice Brennan joined, wrote sepa-
rately to emphasize that the Court had not addressed the issue of the
exception's scope. 193
public policy against the operation of dangerous machinery by one under the influence of drugs
or alcohol.
In a decision recently vacated by the Supreme Court and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Misco, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit expanded the broad
public policy exception the court had previously announced in United States Postal Service.
S.D. Warren Co. v. United Paperworkers Int'l Union, Local 1069, 815 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir.
1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987). For a discussion of United States Postal
Service, see supra notes 129-44 and accompanying text. As in Misco, S.D. Warren discharged
employees for violating a company rule that cited possession, use, or sale of drugs as cause
for discharge. Warren, 815 F.2d at 180. Although discharge was mandatory under the
agreement, the arbitrator reduced the discharge to suspension and reinstated the employees.
Id. at 181. The First Circuit refused to enforce the award because it failed to draw its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 186.
In dicta, the court also addressed the public policy issue of drugs in the workplace. Id. at
186-87. Although the court stated that it would assess public policy "by examining the laws
and legal precedent pertaining to illegal drug sale and use," the court limited this examination
to the observation that all states and the federal government outlaw the sale and use of drugs.
Id. at 186. The court's assessment of public policy focused on public opinion against "the
corrosive consequences" of illegal drug use and the "abominable" threat it poses to workplace
safety and productivity. Id. On that basis, citing no "dominant laws and legal precedent," the
court concluded that "there is a well-defined public policy against the use of drugs in the
workplace." Id. Applying an analysis similar to that of the Fifth Circuit in Great Western, the
court held that criminal laws against drug use, if viewed in relation to the industrial setting,
invalidated the reinstatement as a matter of public policy. Id. at 186-87; see supra note 127
and accompanying text. Because the court's public policy discussion was contained in dicta, it
is difficult to determine the impact that Misco will have on remand.
In an unreported decision, the Sixth Circuit, also applying state drug laws, came to a
conclusion contrary to Warren and upheld an arbitrator's reinstatement of an employee
discharged for drug use on the job. Premium Bldg. Prods. Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am.,
No. 85-3749 slip op. (6th Cir. July 15, 1986). The Premium Building Products court
enunciated three grounds that may explain the different outcomes of the two cases: (1) The
collective bargaining agreement in Premium Building Products contained no rules addressing
drug use; (2) The court sensed that the mere illegality of possession was insufficient to indicate
a well-defined and dominant public policy requiring it to overturn the arbitrator; and (3) The
company had offered no evidence that the employee had ever operated "dangerous"
machinery. Id. at 8-12.
On the first two grounds alone, Premium Building Products indicates that the Sixth
Circuit is a jurisdiction that refuses to interfere in collective bargaining relationships on the
basis of penal statutes alone. The court's third ground for its holding, however, leaves the
Sixth Circuit's position on the public policy exception somewhat ambiguous.
192. Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 374-75 n.12.
193. Id. at 375. Nor, Justice Blackmun observed, had the Court addressed the more
general issue of whether a court's authority to set aside labor arbitration awards on public
policy grounds differs from its authority to refuse to enforce contracts on public policy
grounds. Id.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
V. RECONCILING PUBLIC POLICY AND PRIVATE BARGAINING
A. The Public Policy Exception After Misco
In considering the most expansive approach to the public policy
exception, the Misco Court expressly clarified one extreme of the
range of interpretations of Grace's "well defined and dominant" lan-
guage and implicitly clarified the other. After Misco, it is clear that
the superarbitration approach does not fall within Grace's "well
defined and dominant" public policy exception. Courts, therefore,
may not review an arbitrator's findings of fact, and they may not
invoke the public policy exception based on common sense alone. At
the other extreme, Misco also implies that courts may assume that
laws making it illegal to reinstate an impaired worker do express a
"well defined and dominant" public policy. 194 The proper scope of
the exception, which the Court has yet to address, lies somewhere
between these two extremes. 95 Any court inclined to vacate an arbi-
194. An analysis of the First Circuit's opinion in United States Postal Service v. American
Postal Workers Union illustrates Misco's limited usefulness in guiding the lower courts in their
application of the public policy exception. 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984); see supra notes 129-44
and accompanying text. The United States Postal Service court based its public policy against
reinstating an employee convicted of misappropriating postal funds largely upon "the clear
dictates of common sense." Id. at 825. Standing alone, this basis would fail to pass scrutiny
under Misco. The First Circuit, however, bolstered its common sense basis with criminal laws
against misappropriation and laws expressing the importance of an "efficient" postal service
and a postal worker's "loyalty" to his position. Id. Although Misco has reaffirmed the Grace
requirement of reference to "well defined and dominant" laws, it provides no guidance as to
how much of a legal basis is sufficient to construct a public policy against reinstatement. Nor
does it indicate whether the legal basis must directly address behavior in the workplace, or
whether courts should be permitted to construct a public policy against reinstatement from
general criminal laws and laws regulating the workplace in a general fashion. Finally, the
United States Postal Service court relied upon Great Western for the general proposition that a
precise fit between public policy and the facts of a given case is not necessary to justify a refusal
to enforce a reinstatement order. Id. at 826. The Supreme Court's opinion in Misco does not
specify the role that "legal precedents" are to play as part of the exception. See Misco, 108 S.
Ct. 364 (1987); see also Warren, 815 F.2d at 186 (citing state and federal criminal laws against
the sale and use of drugs to conclude that there is a "well-defined public policy against the use
of drugs in the workplace"); Great Western, 712 F.2d at 124-25 (citing laws against drunk
driving, cases upholding discharge of employees with histories of poor judgment, the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, and "common sense" to shape a public policy against
reinstating a truck driver cited for drunk driving while on duty). Warren and Great Western,
like United States Postal Service, formulated public policy that fell short of illegality to justify
overturning an arbitrator's reinstatement order.
195. This proposition is implicit in the Misco Court's statement that a court must clearly
demonstrate that an arbitrator's award violates public policy before it may refuse to enforce it.
Misco, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74. Laws that expressly make it illegal to reinstate certain impaired
workers are the clearest expressions of public policy against reinstatement. Restricting the
public policy exception to instances of illegality rarely would serve to vindicate a public
interest, however, because there are few laws and regulations that make reinstatement illegal.
Such positive law, however, does exist-at least in the public sector. In the pre-Grace case of
American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 682 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.
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trator's reinstatement order on public policy grounds that fall short of
illegality can find at least some legal basis on which to justify its
action. 96 Thus, at some point arbitration becomes nothing more than
a factfinding mechanism for the courts. The tendency of courts that
espouse an expansive interpretation of Grace to rely upon each other's
methods of extracting public policy from laws and regulations has
proven to be equally questionable. The veil of stare decisis has led to
an inbred expansion of the public policy exception. 197
Perhaps the expanding interpretation of Grace is a judicial reac-
tion to arbitrators who seem to focus solely on individual disputes
rather than on broader social concerns. In turn, however, courts that
vacate awards on public policy grounds short of illegality may very
well encourage a reaction among arbitrators. The reaction may come
in the form of summary justice for the discharged worker; that is,
arbitrators wary of judicial reversal could be more likely to uphold
management's decision to discharge on that ground alone. 98 Arbitra-
tors also may begin to consider questions of public policy expressly in
their decisionmaking. Ironically, doing so may expose them to even
greater judicial scrutiny as they increasingly address issues of public
rights in the course of resolving private disputes under collective bar-
gaining agreements. 99 Even if a more expansive approach to the pub-
1982), for example, the court confronted the issue of whether to enforce an arbitrator's
decision reinstating a postal worker who illegally participated in a strike. The court concluded
that reinstatement required the Postal Service to violate the no strike law for federal
employees, which provides in part: "An individual may not accept or hold a position in the
Government of the United States . . . if he . . . participates in a strike . . . against the
Government of the United States." 5 U.S.C. § 7311 (1982).
196. In its brief to the Supreme Court in Misco, counsel for Misco cited nine sources for the
public policy against drug use in the workplace; some law and some clearly not: (1) an August
4, 1986 speech against drug use by President Ronald Reagan; (2) Executive Order 12,456
requiring federal employees to refrain from use of illegal drugs; (3) the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1982); (4) the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-966; 42 U.S.C. §§ 257-261(a) (1982); (5) state laws against
possession and use of controlled substances; (6) the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1982); (7) a provision of the Louisiana Worker's Compensation
Law relating to employers' liability, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1031 (West 1985); (8) the
traditional tort theory of respondeat superior as well as negligent retention of incompetent
employees; and (9) common sense. Brief for the Respondents at 10-15, United Paperworkers
International Union v. Misco, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987) (No. 86-651).
197. The courts that apply a more expansive approach to the exception justify their
constructions of public policy at least as much upon citation to one another as they do upon
positive law. See Warren, 815 F.2d 178 (1st Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 497
(1987); Misco, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 108 S. Ct 364 (1987); United States Postal
Service, 736 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1984); Great Western, 712 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1983). See supra
notes 105-86 and accompanying text.
198. Admittedly, this would be the worst-case scenario. There is no indication that such a
trend has yet developed.
199. The issue is not whether arbitrators are capable of deciding issues of public law.
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lic policy exception does not induce arbitrators to react in this
manner, it nevertheless is likely to diminish the value of collective
bargaining by imposing further limitations on the finality of
arbitration.
In their attempts to define public policy, courts reading Grace
expansively reinterpret laws that do not expressly address impairment
in the workplace. Yet by emphasizing the public interest in health
and safety, they threaten to undermine the competing, but estab-
lished, public interest in the finality of arbitration as a means of ame-
liorating tensions in the workplace. 200 Because of its malleable
nature, the public policy exception enables employers to obtain a
union's promise not to strike in exchange for a meaningless promise
to adhere to arbitration decisions. Employers who are discontent
with the results of arbitration may abandon it confidently for litiga-
tion. This, in effect, revokes labor's sole means of enforcing the col-
lective bargaining agreement, short of a strike. 21'
B. Determining the Proper Scope of the Exception
Despite the theoretical tensions between courts and arbitration,
the courts still must account for public policy insofar as arbitrators'
decisions do not.2 ° 2 Currently, however, no clear guidelines exist to
enable courts to fulfill their responsibilities while allowing arbitrators
to freely fulfill theirs. A workable distinction is necessary to deter-
mine which laws and regulations express "well defined and domi-
nant" public policy that would justify a court's decision to disturb the
results of arbitration. This distinction should prevent judicial inter-
vention from undermining the public interest in the finality of arbitra-
tion awards, 203 while vindicating clear expressions of public policy
regarding acceptable workplace behavior. In short, this Comment
suggests that courts should restrict the application of the public policy
exception to those instances that require them to vindicate the public
interest expressed in statutes and regulations clearly directed at deter-
ring specific forms of behavior in the workplace.
Rather, the issue is the desirability of allowing them to do so. Judge Harry T. Edwards has
written: "[W]e must determine whether [alternative dispute resolution] will result in an
abandonment of our constitutional system in which the 'rule of law' is created and principally
enforced by legitimate branches of government and whether rights and duties will be delimited
by those the law seeks to regulate." Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or
Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668, 671 (1986); see also F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra
note 3, at 376-77.
200. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 177, at 7-8, Misco.
201. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
202. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766.
203. See supra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
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Statutes and regulations that expressly regulate clearly defined
behavior in the workplace are the only forms of positive law that
embody a "well defined and dominant" expression of public interest
with regard to reinstatement disputes. The postal workers' loyalty
oath,2"4 the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations, 20 5 and the nuclear
safety regulations20 6 all fall within this category. Limiting the scope
of the public policy exception to laws and regulations such as these
would limit judicial intervention to those instances in which reinstate-
ment violates a clear expression of the public interest in deterring the
behavior in question.20 7
Although general criminal laws express the public interest in
deterring specific forms of behavior, they lack a clear connection to
the workplace. Perhaps it is not surprising in a time of heightened
204. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
205. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. For a more recent example of a public
policy exception based upon regulations that fall within this category, see supra note 161.
207. Although not in the context of discharge grievances, federal courts have accepted the
ideas underlying this approach in their review of arbitrators' decisions that address issues
arising under the provisions of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982). See
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 58 n.19 (1974) (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967); Republic Steel Corp v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); Steele v. Louisville &
Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944)). The
federal courts play a special role in vindicating the public interest embodied in Title VII, which
attempts to protect minority rights that the "majoritarian" process of collective bargaining and
arbitration may overlook. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51. Title VII embodies a clear public
interest in discouraging discriminatory behavior and attitudes in the workplace. Arbitrators
may render decisions consistent with the collective agreement yet inconsistent with the broader
goals of Title VII. Consequently, judicially imposed corrective action is the only means by
which values that collective bargaining and arbitration do not consider may be instilled in the
workplace. The Supreme Court thus declared in Alexander that Title VII issues that have
been arbitrated may be relitigated de novo in federal court. Id. at 44-45; see Meltzer,
Arbitration and Employment Discrimination, 39 U. CM. L. REV. 30, 43-46 (1971); see also
Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303, 313-14 (5th Cir. 1970) (Congress
made the federal judiciary the final arbiter of Title VII rights). For further discussion of the
principles underlying the role of the courts in enforcing Title VII, see generally, Isaacson &
Zifchak, Fair Employment Forums After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 16 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 439 (1975); Comment, Federal Courts as Primary Protectors of Title VII Rights, 28
RUTGERS L. REV. 162 (1974).
The public policy exception that this Comment proposes would create a relationship
between courts and arbitrators that also closely resembles the relationship between the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and the arbitrators who interpret the Labor-
Management Relations Act. Like federal courts in Title VII cases, the NLRB is the entity
charged with enforcement of the nation's labor laws. The NLRB stated its "deferral doctrine"
in Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 NLRB 1080 (1955). In Spielberg, the NLRB held that if (1) the
arbitration proceedings appear to have been "fair and regular"; (2) the parties have agreed to
be bound by the decision of the arbitrator; and (3) the arbitrator's decision is not "repugnant to
the purposes and policies of the Act," deference to the arbitrator best serves the "desirable
objective" of voluntary settlement of labor disputes through arbitration. Id. at 1082.
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public concern about drug abuse and its economic costs2° 8 to find that
courts have interpreted Grace's "well defined and dominant" lan-
guage most expansively in these cases.20 9 Courts applying the public
policy exception in this context seem to sense210 an epidemic of drug
use in the workplace and seek to eradicate it by permanently remov-
ing the offending employee from the workforce.211 In their efforts to
rebut what they perceive as lenience on the part of arbitrators, how-
ever, courts justify removal of the drug user on untenable doctrinal
grounds.21 2 Although possession and use of marijuana is illegal, it is
questionable whether courts properly serve the public policy underly-
ing those laws by reversing an arbitrator who reinstates workers who
are caught violating them. The same criticism is true of the Fifth
Circuit's use of laws against drunk driving in Great Western 21 3 to
establish a public policy against reinstating a driver known to have
taken a drink on the job. Criminal sanctions exist to vindicate the
public interest embodied in criminal laws.21 4 Courts therefore should
not extend the sanctions for criminal violations beyond those that
208. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 196, at 9-10 (identifying the "dangers to
health and safety faced by the citizens of this nation and by employees of American industry
because of the use of illegal drugs"). In the brief, attorneys for the respondent argued:
The cost to the American economy [of drug use in the workplace] is enormous:
nearly $26 billion-including $16.6 billion in lost productivity alone-according
to one authoritative study.... But others put the figure much higher. Employees
who use drugs on the job are one-third less productive than straight workers,
three times as likely to be injured and absent far more often. The indirect cost to
the economy is impossible to measure.
Id. (quoting Brecher, Taking Drugs on the Job, Newsweek, Aug. 22, 1983, at 52).
209. Warren, 815 F.2d 178 (lst Cir. 1987), vacated and remanded, 108 S. Ct. 497 (1987);
Misco, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 108 S. Ct. 364 (1987).
210. Although "sense" connotes subjective, rather than objective meaning, the use of the
word in this context best describes the actions taken by courts that adhere to a more expansive
interpretation of Grace for precisely this reason.
211. See supra note 191.
212. See, e.g., Misco, 768 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1985); see supra notes 181-86 and
accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
214. See Local 453, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Machine Workers v. Otis Elevator Co.,
314 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1963). The Second Circuit stated:
[Iln light of the important role which employment plays in implementing the
public policy of rehabilitating those convicted of crime, there can hardly be a
public policy that a man who has been convicted, fined, and subjected to serious
disciplinary measures, can never be ordered reinstated to his former employment
... . Indeed, the arbitrator in effect took into account the importance of
rehabilitation when he concluded that the criminal conviction, the sentence
imposed as a result of that conviction, and the seven-month layoff without pay or
unemployment compensation were appropriate punishment under the
circumstances.
Id. at 29; accord International Ass'n of Machinists, District No. 8 v. Campbell Soup Co., 406
F.2d 1223, 1227 (7th Cir. 1969). But see United States Postal Workers, 736 F.2d at 825.
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already exist, unless a criminal law clearly requires removal of the
offender from the workplace.
Although laws and regulations exist that address the workplace
generally, most of them do not contain the requisite connection to the
public interest in regulating workplace behavior. These laws thus
provide equally insufficient justification for using the public policy
exception to overturn an arbitrator's reinstatement order. Typical of
such a law is the Postal Reorganization Act 215 provision that requires
the Postal Service to be reliable and efficient."z 6 Although it declares
the responsibility of the Postal Service as a whole, the law is not one
that expressly regulates the behavior of individual employees. As
such, it does not provide sufficient grounds to justify a court's decision
to reverse an arbitrator's order to reinstate an impaired worker. A
court's reliance on such a law essentially enables it to retry a dispute
that an arbitrator has already resolved. Similar to a court's reliance
on criminal laws that do not address the workplace, this approach
unnecessarily compromises the finality of arbitration.
VI. CONCLUSION
Given the nature of both arbitration and the courts as dispute
resolution institutions, it is perhaps inevitable that the two will con-
flict. Although both arbitration and the courts perform the same dis-
pute resolution function at one level, they differ fundamentally in
their structure and purpose. Use of the public policy exception high-
lights these differences. The arbitrator's responsibility is to resolve
disputes between unions and employers within the confines of a par-
ticular collective agreement, within a particular workplace. The judi-
ciary's responsibility, under the dictates of Grace, is to effectuate
public policy insofar as it conflicts with the arbitrator's decision.
Grace's open-ended language, however, has permitted courts to grad-
ually abandon the doctrine of judicial deference to arbitration deci-
sions. Although the Supreme Court in Misco addressed the outer
limits of judicial intervention, it has yet to confront the public policy
exception directly.
Recognizing the potential for tension between arbitrators and the
courts, this Comment has attempted to fashion a viable compromise
governing a small subset of those instances in which the two interact.
The public interest in discouraging certain illegal or reckless activities
may be a worthy one. Nonetheless, whether engaging in that behav-
ior sufficiently harms the public interest as to demand denial of
215. 39 U.S.C. §§ 101-5605 (1982).
216. 39 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1982); see supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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employment is a separate issue that legislative bodies and administra-
tive agencies-not the courts-should address. Continued judicial
review and reversal of arbitration decisions on judicially created pub-
lic policy grounds will further undermine the stability of collective
bargaining relationships. Restricting the public policy exception to
express statements of public interest in reinstatement would enable
both unions and employers to engage in collective bargaining with a
more accurate understanding of their relative bargaining positions.
Furthermore, the parties would have the security of knowing that an
agreement, once struck, would be truly binding and conducive to a
harmonious workplace relationship. As long as the exception's
proper scope remains uncertain, however, arbitration's efficacy as a
final means of dispute resolution, and thus a source of stability in
labor-management relations, remains uncertain as well.
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